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24 May 1961




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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24 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Laos. (*Page i*)
2. South Korea. (*Page ii*)
3. Congo: Hammarskjold decides against sending Dayal back to Congo; Nehru agrees to recall Dayal to India. (*Page iii*)
4. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Further comment on border clash in Pushtoon tribal area. (*Page iii*)
5. Iran: Tension over coup reports rises with Shah out of country. (*Page iii*)
6. Jordan: Army appears willing and able to control possible trouble during King's wedding. (*Page iv*)
7. Yugoslavia: Poor winter wheat harvest further complicates implementation of economic reform program. (*Page iv*)
8. Cuba: Further bloc arms cargoes arrive.
(*Page iv*)
9. Brazil: Trade negotiations with USSR almost completed.
(*Page v*)
10. Colombia: General instability threatened. (*Page v*)
11. British Foreign Office draft evaluation of the situation in France. (*Page vi*)

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Laos: [Phoumi reports that in a meeting on 20 May in northeastern Thailand, Premier Sarit assured him that the Americans would not abandon Phoumi, although the US was committed to exhaust all means of finding a political solution to the Laotian crisis. Sarit reportedly claimed that he had six battalions of Thai troops ready to help in Laos, but their commitment had been held up by the US. Phoumi also stated that his recent visit to Savannakhet was for the purpose of getting offices and living quarters ready--"just in case"--an apparent follow-up on his previous threat to move the government to southern Laos if the United States failed to guarantee military help in the event of a Pathet Lao drive on either Luang Prabang or Vientiane.]

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[Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are still active in the Ban Pa Dong area and are ambushing government troops on Route 13 north of Vientiane. There were no reported actions on the other major fronts.] [redacted]

Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 24 May. The recent increase in scheduled flights to the Vinh - Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam may be related to reports of an enemy build-up in the Tchepone area. [redacted]

[The most recent of these reports comes from a South Vietnamese source at Hue, who claims that about 1,000 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in the Tchepone area have begun "aggressive reconnaissance" eastward toward the Vietnam border where Laotian and South Vietnamese forces are located.] [redacted]

[Based on available information, the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board concludes that the Communists intend to take Ban Pa Dong and an attack may be launched at any time.] [redacted]

Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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South Korea: Major General Pak Chong-hui, actual leader of the military revolt, informed General Carter Magruder, United Nations commander, on 23 May that the new government desires to return its armed forces to UN control. He added, however, that security considerations in Seoul currently prevent compliance with orders of the United Nations Command that troops removed from the combat area during the coup be returned to their positions.

Besides wanting to retain in Seoul troops on whom he can rely, Pak's temporizing may be the result of a split within the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. The split is apparently between a moderate group led by Lieutenant General Chang To-yong, army chief of staff and head of the new cabinet, and a larger group, led by Pak and Marine Corps Commandant Kim Yun-kun, which is attempting to expand its military control over all aspects of national life. There are reports of dissatisfaction among army colonels who, along with General Pak, planned and executed the coup but who were subsequently denied cabinet posts in favor of general officers who joined the revolt belatedly.

Mass arrests continue, including those of high military officers and the speaker of the house of representatives, Kwak Sang-hun, who returned to Korea on 22 May from a visit to Washington. Official efforts to marshal student and veterans' demonstrations in favor of the new government have met with unenthusiastic response. (Backup, Page 3)


24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

Republic of the Congo



24 May 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map Page

~~TOP SECRET~~

Congo: [Hammar-skjold has informed US officials that Dayal will not be returned to Leopoldville as senior UN representative because of the latest demonstrations of Congolese hostility toward him. Hammar-skjold implied that he regarded the behavior of the Leopoldville government as outrageous and indicated that there might be a delay in dispatching Dayal's successor--U Hla Maung of Burma--to Leopoldville. He stated that Nehru had been informed and had agreed to recall Dayal to India.]

No

[The Leopoldville government will probably regard Hammar-skjold's decision as a victory which will strengthen its hand in dealing with other Congolese factions. Several reports indicate that the Leopoldville government is favorably disposed toward negotiations with Katanga, which recently has indicated its willingness to discuss participation in a Congo federation as desired by Kasavubu.]
(Backup, Page 5) (Map)

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistan Air Force planes continue to bomb hostile concentrations in Pakistan near the Afghan border. Pakistani officials [] indicate that they are ready to bomb Afghan artillery positions located in Afghan territory if these should fire across the border into Pakistan. Pakistan continues to be confident of its ability to handle the situation in the border area following the 20 May attacks, which were apparently launched by Afghan special forces disguised as tribesmen and supported by dissident local tribesmen. Kabul continues to deny that its forces were directly involved in the 20 May attacks, attributing these entirely to local Pushtoon tribesmen resisting Pakistani Government "oppression." [] Map on reverse of page) []

OK

Iran: [Prime Minister Amini ordered a partial military alert on 19 May in response to a report that General Bakhtiar, former chief of the National Intelligence Organization, was planning a coup. Amini []]

No

24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] asked Bakhtiar and two other generals he thought were involved in the coup to leave Tehran. General Hejazi, chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff, however, [redacted] labeling the coup report as unfounded. Bakhtiar believes that General Haj Ali Kia, former chief of intelligence for the Supreme Commander's Staff and now jailed for corruption, was able to convey the story of the coup to Amini. Bakhtiar [redacted] supports Prime Minister Amini but will continue his "contingency planning" for a coup, as action on short notice would be necessary if Amini failed. [redacted]

Jordan: Army units in Amman and in west Jordan have been reinforced as a precaution against possible trouble during King Husayn's wedding on 25 May to a British commoner. The army appears willing and able to control the immediate situation. [redacted] (Backup, Page 6)

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Yugoslavia: As a result of adverse weather, Yugoslavia's winter wheat harvest will fall substantially short of the approximately 4 million tons needed to meet domestic requirements. According to the American Embassy, Belgrade will request that the US supply 700,000 tons of wheat--beyond the 200,000 tons already granted--between now and the end of the year and may ask for an additional 600,000 tons to tide it over until the 1962 harvest. Failure to obtain this wheat would further complicate Yugoslavia's already difficult adjustment to the far-reaching economic reform which is being put into effect. Belgrade will in any event suffer political embarrassment, since regime leaders boasted after the good harvest in 1959 and the average harvest in 1960 that this, among other economic successes, proved the superiority of its economic system over that of the Sino-Soviet bloc. [redacted]

OK

Soviet Bloc - Cuba: The Soviet merchant ship Bolshevik Sukhanov delivered a cargo to the Cuban port of Mariel on 21 or 22 May under circumstances which suggest that this is the first major bloc military shipment to Cuba since 10 April. [redacted]

No

24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Another Soviet vessel, the Ivan Sechenov, probably arrived shortly after the Bolshevik Sukhanov, also evidently with a military shipment; and at least one other Soviet vessel now en route to Cuba may be carrying arms. [redacted]

[redacted] precautionary measures normal for previous arms shipments were taken on 21 May for receiving the arms, including prohibition of flights over the unloading area and stationing of guards along the delivery routes. Prior to these deliveries, 14 Soviet ships had supplied about 40,000 tons of bloc arms and military equipment to Cuba since major shipments began last September, [redacted]

Brazil-USSR: Brazilian Foreign Ministry officials in Moscow have told the US Embassy that they have almost completed trade-and-payments negotiations with the USSR. They insist, however, that they have refused to negotiate on questions of future diplomatic relations, upon which President Quadros is to decide personally. The Brazilians state that no Soviet credit to Brazil is involved. A second Brazilian trade mission has visited Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Hungary and has secured credits from the latter two, each for up to \$50,000,000 over a several-year period. This mission is now in Poland. [redacted] (Backup, Page 8)

Colombia: Rural violence, long endemic in Colombia, has increased during the past several months, with over 1,000 known to have been killed since January 1961. This breakdown of civil order has been accompanied by public lack of confidence in the courts, the police, and even the army as means of protection in the affected rural areas. Communist and pro-Castro agitation has periodically encouraged the violence, which is now on the increase in important coffee growing regions. This rural instability is accompanied by a political impasse as the governing coalition is unable to agree on procedures for the presidential election next May. [redacted] (Backup, Page 9)

24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

~~TOP SECRET~~

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*France:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[. . . With the opening of the Evian talks, there is an air of nervousness in metropolitan France, and a danger that General de Gaulle, in giving expression to some recognition of the support given to him by the trade unions and the left-wing politicians during the crisis, is lending color to allegations of the dissident generals that they were rescuing France from a drift toward left-wing extremism.]

no

[The Communists have assisted this process in following up the one-hour token strike of 24 April, for which they claim credit, by calling out railway workers and public transport workers in Paris and doing their best to exploit discontent in the civil service. The French Government has taken powers to requisition the services of civil servants if necessary, and this gives further ammunition to the Communists. Although Her Majesty's Embassy considers that the Communists may have shot their bolt for the time being, the non-Communist unions need a success from the government to restore the position. . . .]

[This general situation, in which the short-term aims of the Communists and of the extreme right coincide, contains all the preconditions for a further attempt at a coup d'etat from which the Communists could only gain whatever the outcome. The most obvious form such a coup might take would be assassination of General de Gaulle.]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

vi

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~Situation in Laos

Laotian Government delegates to the Namone talks have confided to American Embassy personnel in Vientiane that they have been given an "inferiority complex" by the Pathet Lao negotiators. They assert that the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma representatives act like conquerors who have come to dictate terms. The presence of battle-hardened Pathet Lao troops in Namone village drives home to the Vientiane delegates the weakness of their position. This pressure is augmented by well-staged demonstrations by the villagers, peace-slogan placards, and such devices as having Soviet helicopters flying overhead as the government delegates arrive. The Souvanna group apparently is also feeling the pressure of the Pathet Lao presence; Peng Phongsavan, the delegation leader, remarked to the government delegation that "it is not as easy as you think to keep a position of independence when you are surrounded day and night by those fellows."

[redacted] Kong Le and his troops are kept separate from the Pathet Lao forces. Kong Le is said to have five battalions, four of which are paratroop units. Pathet Lao strength in the Plaine des Jarres area is estimated at four infantry battalions, all of which have artillery sections attached to them. The artillery is manned largely by North Vietnamese troops. [redacted] there are about 50 Soviet specialists in the area.]

[redacted] Indian Foreign Secretary Desai expounded at some length [redacted] regarding the Indian Government's views on Laos, stressing its continuing reservations concerning the American position. New Delhi is convinced that the only feasible way to neutralize Laos, and thus effectively contain the Chinese Communists, is through acceptance of Souvanna as premier. India believes that US backing of Boun Oum and Phoumi only makes matters worse by creating a three-way split which gives the Pathet Lao increased influence. Since the Pathet Lao cannot be eliminated, India urges that the United States accept Souvanna as the "second-best solution." Concerning [redacted]

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[REDACTED] the question of controls, Desai emphasized that the goal of an externally guaranteed non-Communist Laos was theoretically and practically impossible, since no outside power can determine political development within Laos. The ICC function should be limited to supervision of the cease-fire and fair elections and the control of foreign intervention.] [REDACTED]

King Savang. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] pleaded inability to use his influence to persuade the Boun Oum government to participate in the Geneva Conference. [REDACTED] "out of respect for specific constitutional rules, I am unable to furnish useful assistance in the solution of a problem which has escaped alike the border of Laos and the constitutional framework of the Kingdom." This [REDACTED] was in response to Sihanouk's appeal to Laos to reconsider its position of boycotting the Geneva Conference.

[REDACTED] Airlift operations on 22 May involved a total of 21 airlift and airlift-associated sorties--twenty by Soviet transports and one by a North Vietnamese aircraft. Of this number, at least three IL-14s and four LI-2s were reflected in flights into Laos. The Soviet IL-14 which flew to Hanoi from the USSR between 18 and 19 May left Hanoi for Peiping on 22 May in what is probably a return flight to the USSR.] [REDACTED]

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South Korean Situation

[Elements of the 5th and 12th Infantry Divisions, which had been serving as reserve units on the northern border, and three field artillery battalions from the Sixth Corps, also in the same area, were withdrawn to the Seoul area shortly after the coup on 16 May. These units, plus rear-area marine and army airborne forces which actually carried out the coup, remain in or near the city. American military observers point out that the withdrawal of these forces has seriously weakened the combat front, particularly in regard to artillery support.]

[The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) has arrested two additional brigadiers, one a front-line division commander, and three colonels. Thus far, however, the SCNR has dealt leniently with Second Army Commander and former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong-nok, who did not support the coup and temporarily blocked a military takeover in the city of Taegu. Choe has been relieved of command and ordered to proceed unescorted to army headquarters in Seoul.]


The nationwide crackdown continues; military tribunals have been established throughout the country to handle "murder, arson, and rebellion, disturbances, and other criminal cases" except those which were being processed by civilian courts. Reserve legal officers have been recalled to the army, presumably to try such cases. Reserve medical officers who were released prior to completion of military service also have been recalled. The SCNR has issued an order authorizing the suspension of newspapers and other publications, and one unconfirmed report indicates that 75 of the nation's 110 newspapers have been closed. Radio listeners are reported turning to Pyongyang broadcasts for "uncensored news."

President Yun Po-sun, according to his personal secretary who talked with an American Embassy officer on 22 May, believes that a return to civilian authority is imperative and that the longer the junta remains in power, the worse it will be for the South

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Korean Army. Yun sees long military rule increasing factionalism in the army and further weakening military discipline. He believes that there should be a return to civilian authority within a maximum of six months under a strong presidential system, but claims he is not thinking of himself as a candidate.



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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]The Situation in the Congo [REDACTED]

[Hammar skjold's decision not to return Dayal to the Congo followed strong representations by officials of the Leopoldville government, who emphasized that Dayal's return would jeopardize agreements between the Leopoldville government and the UN. As recently as 17 May, Hammar skjold had indicated to Ambassador Stevenson that he planned to return Dayal to the Congo, at least for a short time, out of deference to Nehru.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[According to press reports, Stanleyville troops have appeared in force in Kasai Province, parts of which were evacuated by the UN Command following the massacre of a Ghanaian detachment at Port Franqui. Gizenga reportedly plans to launch a campaign against areas not under his control when the dry season begins in late May or June. Although there is no firm information that Gizenga plans a major offensive action, Gizenga's messages to Ghanaian President Nkrumah have urged that Nkrumah expedite the airlifting of Soviet arms to Stanleyville.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[The premier of the Leopoldville government, Joseph Ileo, reportedly stated in mid-May that his government had accepted a Soviet offer to send a Red Cross team to the Congo. Ileo said that the Leopoldville government would be unwise to cut itself off entirely from the prospect of bloc aid, and stated that the Soviets would be kept under surveillance. The Soviet Red Cross has tried unsuccessfully to pressure the International Red Cross to permit the Soviets to send relief supplies and medicines directly to Stanleyville via the Sudan and British East Africa.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]Developments in Jordan [REDACTED]

[It is not at all certain how long key army elements will continue to support King Husayn. Army Commander in Chief Habis Majalli, a cousin of the late Prime Minister Hazza Majalli, intends to retire about the end of May ostensibly because of ill health, [REDACTED]. His real reason, however, is said to be that he feels King Husayn has placed him and the Jordanian Army in a false position by publishing letters in which the King thanked the army for its "wholehearted support" of his forthcoming marriage. Majalli reportedly does not believe the marriage will be good for Jordan nor does "a large part" of the army.]

[Husayn [REDACTED] wrote and published the letters in order to put the army in a position from which it could only with difficulty openly criticize the marriage, and to reduce the effectiveness of any effort which might be made by one or another faction within the army to exploit the situation. The King apparently had been prepared to lose a small amount of support as a result of his decision to marry Toni Gardiner, but he had not expected the unfavorable reaction by most of his people.]

[In Palestinian West Jordan, long a source of strong opposition to the King and his regime, [REDACTED] Husayn has irreparably shattered the image he has attempted to create of being a champion of the Arabs and a staunch defender of Islam. Moreover, there is a widespread feeling that the only heir to his kingdom will be the UAR's Nasir. However, underground political parties thus far have apparently undertaken little organized opposition activity.]

[Shortly after the wedding, Husayn probably will make the cabinet changes he has had under consideration. Samir Rifai, a former prime minister who is widely regarded in Jordan as being under American influence, reportedly claims to have been assured by the King, during a recent audience, that he "would be pleased" with the King's plans. The unpopular but capable Rifai apparently is slated for some cabinet position and may again become prime minister.] [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] Rifai, who was then out of power, had expressed sympathy toward the UAR and a willingness to cooperate with Cairo in opposition to the Jordanian government then in office. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]Brazil - Soviet Bloc

The USSR was unwilling to make a multilateral trade arrangement with Brazil as it has done with Cuba. The Brazilian officials told the US Embassy in Moscow that when they suggested that rubles might be accumulated in an account which could be used to finance Brazilian trade with other bloc nations, the Soviets refused, insisting on a Brazilian pledge to purchase an amount equivalent to Soviet purchases of coffee, sisal, and other products. The Brazilians have implied that they will suggest to President Quadros that a trade mission be established in Moscow as a first step toward diplomatic relations. They apparently expect a dispute with the Soviets over the press communiqué when negotiations are completed in about a week, and say they will refuse to participate if the Soviets insist on unacceptable language.

The second Brazilian trade mission to the bloc, headed by Ambassador Joao Dantas, who is personally close to President Quadros, is planning to go to East Germany after completing negotiations in Poland. [redacted]

[redacted] Dantas estimates that total Brazilian trade--including trade financed by credit--with the Eastern European satellites and Yugoslavia will come to a billion dollars over the next five years. Total Brazilian trade with all countries has been running at about \$2.7 billion annually. The Dantas mission will probably also go to Moscow and North Korea and may go to Mongolia and Vietnam, according to an intercepted message of 18 May. In Moscow, Dantas may intend to discuss diplomatic relations with the USSR. He is more likely than the Foreign Ministry officials now in Moscow to have been given this authority by Quadros.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Situation in Colombia

As part of the effort to re-establish civilian rule after the military dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-57), Colombia passed a constitutional amendment in 1958 providing for long-term collaboration between the Liberal and Conservative parties in a "National Front." This requires the two parties to alternate in the presidency and otherwise to maintain parity in all elective and appointive offices until 1974.

Since President Lleras Camargo is a Liberal, the joint candidate for president in the May 1962 election must be a Conservative, but the law does not specify how he shall be nominated. The Liberal party, which won a majority of the popular vote in the 1958 congressional elections, wants an equal voice in choosing the candidate, while the right wing of the Conservative party, led by former President Laureano Gomez, insists that the nomination is a Conservative prerogative. This impasse has continued since late 1960, and both inter- and intraparty antagonisms are becoming increasingly bitter--a factor which has impeded congressional action on such important legislation as the government's program for agrarian reform. The Liberal Revolutionary Movement, a dissident Liberal faction which has evidenced some pro-Castro and Communist sympathies, is planning to run its own presidential candidate in protest against the National Front system.

A semi-anarchy characterized by outbreaks of indiscriminate murder has prevailed in many rural areas since constitutional government broke down in 1948; it is conservatively estimated that over 250,000 people have died by violence in this period and that some 1,500,000 peasants have been displaced. The violence is not attributable to any single cause; it springs from a complex of agrarian grievances, regional rivalries, and sharp party antagonisms. The centers of violence shift from time to time and at present seem to be located in the agriculturally rich departments of Cauca and Valle, which are important coffee-growing regions.

Rural unrest decreased markedly in the first two years of President Lleras' term, but Colombian Army figures for the first four months of this year list 1,038 deaths by violence as

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compared with 892 for the same period in 1960. The army commander in chief, motivated partly by a desire to deflect criticism from the army for permitting this resurgence of violence, publicly attributed it to party antagonisms over the approaching elections and warned that state-of-siege powers in the departments concerned might have to be broadened. Subsequently, Lleras banned all political activity there for an indefinite period.

Colombian political observers noted that, for the first time since Rojas' overthrow, the military were "suggesting" a course of action to political leaders. Rojas, following his release from government detention, has started making political speeches again, and some politicians are disturbed by his re-emergence; the US Embassy in Bogota, however, does not consider him a serious threat to the regime at this time. The National Civil Registry last week deprived Rojas of all prerogatives of citizenship.

There have also been rumors of plans for a coup by pro-Castro elements; the Bogota police have frustrated several bombing attempts in the past two weeks; and on 19 May the government indicated its concern over subversive activities by announcing the initiation of an army investigation of such activities.

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

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The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

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